How can American universities regain their country's trust? The question is everywhere. It gives deceptively concise expression to the crisis of confidence roiling colleges nationwide and so has risen to the top of many agendas. A report filed with Yale's president last month confirms the thorniness of the question by giving no fewer than 17 answers to it. These answers include the expected calls for pluralism and academic freedom. But wedged among them is the suggestion that American universities awaken in students a sense of their common civic duty by way of a common curriculum.

So another question arises: How, without trespassing upon pluralistic freedom, can a college manage that?

For help, universities might look to an institution that enjoys the country's trust at a stubbornly high rate: the American military. This might sound ridiculous. The soldier and the student hardly seem like natural partners. The loyalty that marks a soldier looks, on campus, like anti-intellectualism. The playful dissent which enlivens a seminar can become, in battle, a fatal liability. But the great common curricula of the 20th century, to which colleges now turn an aspirant eye, emerged in part from the army camp. It is worth revisiting that history to get a sense of how colleges might, by way of common learning, win back their country's trust.

At the end of the First World War, the U.S. Army set up a school expressly for soldiers at Beaune in the Cote D'Or region of France. They met for class in Red Cross hospitals built to treat their wounded, now empty thanks to the armistice. What other rooms the soldiers needed they built by hand with excess materiel unloaded from trains, working alongside their faculty, Black stevedores, and German prisoners. The school formed at the order of General John Pershing, who worried that his two million men left idle by peace would otherwise busy themselves with "chicken shit."

The AEF University, as it was known (standing for American Expeditionary Forces), convened for a single term that lasted three dense months. During that term, doughboys could study anything. Courses on offer included practical ones like dentistry, mining, tort law, school administration, animal husbandry, insurance, pharmacy, and accounting. There were also painting, voice, sculpture, Greek, violin, and literature. Visiting troupes put on the French classics at the university theater. Architectural drawing trips were made to Paris.

An onlooker might have been forgiven for thinking the project insane. Mass mobilization had afforded America the rare opportunity to see herself, and what she saw did not flatter. The YMCA, entrusted with the education of the troops for much of America's short war, found high rates of illiteracy. Hundreds of thousands of selective-service enrollees could not sign their name. Many could do little more than that. Were these men ready for Molière? Indeed, some of them were. The school succeeded. Letters and later reflections from students and teachers suggest that the semester stoked in many a lifelong love of the liberal arts, to say nothing of their studies' practical value back home.

Much credit for the school's success goes to a literature professor named John Erskine, on loan from Columbia University. Today, Erskine looks like a preposterous choice for an army bureaucrat. He was a poet. He had no military background. He would later see great commercial and critical success as a novelist. All the while he composed music seriously and played the piano well. He would be the first president of Juilliard.

Yet the army took to Erskine, and he took to it. In his work organizing the education of soldiers, Erskine proved himself to army officers as a rare man of letters with an executive sensibility. In turn, Erskine found those officers for the most part to be men of action with open minds, both qualities perhaps scarce on campus quads back home. He discerned from the khaki mass passing through his classrooms that in each man was the potential for liberal learning. He also discovered that the discipline and standardization inherent in military life could be liberal learning's best friend.

Armed with these insights, Erskine returned to Morningside Heights in late 1919. There he set out to establish a course — one he had first proposed without success to faculty before the war, now with new conviction. The idea was that every week for two years, small groups of students would meet to closely read a great book of Western civilization, that same civilization for which the men Erskine taught had fought in France. This time the proposal was approved. The course first met in the autumn of 1920. It was called, as a concession to faculty skeptical that any student could understand the classics, General Honors. Erskine preferred simply Great Books.

The students of General Honors met in Columbia's Hamilton Hall, around a long table at which they smoked and discussed the week's book. Supervising the discussion were two instructors who sought to achieve a sort of Socratic dialogue. This now-familiar approach was then novel. The course scandalized some faculty for its use of translations and the speed with which it moved through the classics. But for Erskine, the course's democratic, even amateurish aspect was its point. His was a gamble that the gains to be had by introducing the Western canon to students who sought it was worth the costs.

That gamble paid off. It did so thanks in part to Erskine's own teaching ability. Before the war, Erskine's powers were already legend, such that Oscar Hammerstein II, once Erskine's student, later said he owed "whatever I've done in theater" to Erskine's poetry instruction. But those powers found new expression in the General Honors classroom. The novelist Henry Morton Robinson, an early enrollee, wrote of Erskine: "I believe he could make dry bread and Icelandic grammar seem a symposium. His erudition is vast, but he rides it easily." An admiring student named Lionel Trilling would borrow the essay title "The Moral Obligation to Be Intelligent" from Erskine. A brilliant young graduate named Rexford Tugwell was so drawn by Erskine's teaching that in 1923 he co-taught a section of General Honors. It is reported that one president of Columbia, Dwight D. Eisenhower, called Erskine "the greatest teacher Columbia ever had."

The General Honors course would go on to make a great mark on American liberal education. It persists in modified form at Columbia today as Literature and Humanities, a fixture of the university's core curriculum. Mortimer J. Adler, another General Honors student, brought the course's underlying idea to the University of Chicago, where it remade the curriculum and inspired similar reforms at places like St. John's College, Harvard University, and the University of Virginia. One finds its fingerprints also on many state schools, adult-education programs, and high-school curricula.

While Erskine was overseeing the education of the American soldier in Europe, back in the United States the army was establishing the Student Army Training Corps, or SATC, to fill the officer billets of its war-swollen ranks. Chapters quickly formed on hundreds of college campuses, where they supplemented the education of young American men with military training so they might emerge from school ready to serve in Europe. Colleges welcomed these chapters, not least of all because the SATC allowed students who sought to serve a way to do so while studying. Without such an out, enrollment would have cratered as students enlisted or were drafted.

Included in the SATC curriculum, alongside classes on artillery gunnery and surveying and camp sanitation, was a course called War Aims. The participating civilian faculty who taught War Aims at the many enrolled campuses had little in way of guidance. A lean memorandum circulated by the War Department stated only that the task of the War Aims course was to explain, in addition to aspects of the world situation like Prussian militarism and British colonial holdings, "what we are fighting for" and "the meaning of autocracy and of democracy."

The author of the memorandum to faculty teaching War Aims was a young academic named Frank Aydelotte. He was a Rhodes Scholar who taught English literature at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before the war. After it he would become the president of Swarthmore College, then direct the Institute for Advanced Study. But during the war, Aydelotte served as the War Aims course director. From a perch at the War Department in Washington, he self-consciously oversaw a massive experiment in liberal, interdisciplinary education, one expressly designed to avoid propaganda and instead present facts as the basis for in-class debate. The idea was that a democratic soldiers would fight best if their liberal cause was "typified by their own free institutions."

The War Aims course was a huge success — so much so that faculty across the country refused to let it die at the war's end. At Columbia, professors proposed a course called "Peace Aims" that might continue to teach students about Western civilization in the same interdisciplinary, generalist mode that made War Aims innovative. Certainly, there had been Western survey courses before it, such as Archibald Cary Coolidge's History I at Harvard, launched in 1893. But War Aims struck the many educators who helped administer it as novel and good enough to sustain. Their aim was to craft a required course that would furnish students with a common understanding of the civilization in which they all had a stake and so leave them "intelligent, sympathetic, and liberal."

Though the name Peace Aims did not stick, the idea did. The proposed course debuted at Columbia in 1919 under the name Contemporary Civilization. It succeeded and quickly inspired like initiatives across the country. By 1921 the Columbia Daily Spectator reported the course had imitators at Rutgers, Dartmouth, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, and Chicago. It might be the most influential survey course in the country's history. One scholar has since christened Contemporary Civilization the "grandparent of modern general education." It is a ready if imperfect model for any effort, such as that summoned by the Yale report, to give students a sense of common ground for civic life.

It's not hard to imagine skepticism at the suggestion that the American liberal arts turn to the military as a model. Whether one calls it War Aims or Peace Aims, perhaps any martial approach to the common core threatens the norms of academic freedom that have rightly thickened since the First World War.

Even in Erskine's day, the war seemed a threat to academic freedom. Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler declared in June of 1917 that any student or faculty member who publicly opposed America's entry into the war was committing treason and would be separated from the university. Butler's threat against wartime dissent showed its teeth later the same year. When a prominent psychology professor and longtime campus gadfly named James McKeen Cattell wrote a protest to the wartime draft on Columbia stationery, the trustees fired him. The great economic historian Charles A. Beard, who supported the war, saw Cattell's firing as such an affront to liberal values that he himself resigned from Columbia's faculty in protest a week later.

Wartime trespasses on academic freedom were not isolated to Columbia. The historian Carol S. Gruber has inventoried dozens of instances in which universities fired faculty members or otherwise nudged them to resign for their hostility to American intervention in the First World War. And those numbers fail to account for the self-censorship that followed and for contracts that simply went unrenewed. Such discipline moved Upton Sinclair to flay what he saw as statist schools in a now-forgotten 1923 book called The Goose-Step.

But it would be an error to conflate the idea of a core curriculum — even one that seeks to equip students for American citizenship — with wartime intolerance or attendant jingoism. That intolerance and jingoism arose from political currents which generally ran apart from, if briefly parallel to, the project of common learning. To know as much one need only observe that for a long time after the American Association of University Professors asserted a right to academic freedom, great American core curricula thrived. Common learning does not imply animus toward that which is not on the syllabus.

Concerns that American schools might compromise their academic mission by again taking cues from the American garrison supposes that absent the soldier, a college reverts to some impartial skeptical mode. The historical record suggests otherwise. Demands that the American academy divorce from the military reached their height during the Vietnam War. Anti-war protestors punctuated these demands by firebombing some thirty ROTC buildings. And the protestors largely got their way, at least at the older liberal-arts campuses. From 1968 to 1974, while the military footprint on campuses out West either held or grew, the East Coast saw a 30 percent drop in ROTC units. These departures occurred disproportionately at the most prestigious schools, the same ones that have since hemorrhaged the most trust.

Impartiality and pluralism did not flower on campuses in the wake of the military's departure. Rather, there developed on liberal-arts campuses something of an intellectual monoculture. What's more, that monoculture lacked the positive self-confidence of the earlier age. It offered no common education that furnished graduates with intellectual equipment for citizenship. It could at best interrogate the Western tradition that War Aims once surveyed. Among the victims, to observers such as Allan Bloom, was the very humanistic tradition Erskine once championed. Rather than academic freedom, the result was, as Lionel Trilling anticipated back in 1973, no less than "a diminution of national possibility."

Erskine wrote late in his life that before the war he was convinced "the humanities would fare best when far removed from military discipline," but "Beaune converted me." What is it about military discipline that so converted scholars like Erskine and Aydelotte? What can an American university, one seeking to re-establish a common and humane learning and so recover its country's trust, learn from the soldier?

First, a common education must offer more than simply an invitation to interrogate or to transgress. Neither "heterodoxy" nor its synonyms have any meaning stable enough to win lasting trust either from student or from society. A common education must contain a positive vision, just as a soldier's education is not impartial to the fight that awaits her. If students are to graduate ready for the field of action that is a civic life, they must carry within an examined, positive vision robust enough to sustain the sacrifice a civic life demands.

One adds "examined" as a modifier because a positive vision does not a dogma make. Aydelotte was firm that the War Aims course taught to SATC cadets was neither propaganda nor agnostic about the cause for which those cadets might one day die. The same was said for the Contemporary Civilization course that followed. At its launch, a Columbia faculty dean described the course, which would in turn inspire so many models, as "born of a consciousness that a democracy needs to know what it is fighting for."

Universities must learn from their military history that common learning can and indeed ought to be democratic. It is true that the idea of a "Great Books" course predated Erskine's contact with the U.S. Army (as did notions of a general education, partially a reaction at the century's start to President Charles William Eliot's elective reforms at Harvard). But Erskine returned from the AEF University at Beaune a witness to the common soldier's capacity for learning, and only with the force of witness testimony was he able to get his General Honors course, which supposed the everyman could also tangle with great works, off the ground. The idea is evergreen. One must enforce standards without retreating into worship of "expertise," as such talk risks snuffing out what Erskine called "democratic sympathy," a nonpaternalistic fellow-feeling with citizens beyond the gates of campus.

To proffer these lessons is not to recommend that the liberal-arts school ape a garrison. But the history of the country's liberal-arts core curricula shows there is more affinity between the two than one might guess. The great monuments of American liberal education were thrown up not despite the military but in large part by it. They emerged not only from Edenic gardens of free inquiry but also from army camps. Though ideas of a general education or great-books seminars predated any glimmer of an American Expeditionary Force, it took sustained contact with the military to give such ideas an enduring form. And as Americans schools desirous of their country's trust chart a path into the middle of this century, such history commands their attention.