The Battle of the Somme came to an end 110 years ago. It claimed among its casualties some million men, untold beasts of burden, and a way of knowing the world. It left behind a great vacuum into which an adolescent modernity rushed. A century on, historians still say we have lived in a world the Great War made.
Until now, perhaps. For it seems now likely that artificial intelligence, even if it does not exact the same price in blood, will deal a similar blow to our ways of knowing and conveying the truth. We worry that literature might not make it through. It’s on that epistemic death and its consequences for literature that this essay will dwell. This week’s anniversary seems as good a moment as any then to consider what such parallels might tell us about how to survive a Somme. We will see two ways that fail, and one that shows promise.
I.
The surest way to survive the Somme is to not show up at all. No school of thought passed this test. Few were the pacifists among Western intellectuals in 1914 and by 1916 the situation hadn’t much changed. In his book Redemption by War, historian Roland Stromberg shows by meticulous inventory that virtually all the thinkers whom we now admire as great lights were not only unopposed to the war but enthusiastic about the rejuvenation it promised. The book’s epigraph quotes Shaw: “When war is declared we all go mad.” Note “we” and “all.”
Perhaps no thinkers went more mad for the war than students of Romanticism. It would be wrong to say that the Romantics caused the war, or to suggest that they were alone in indulging “August ideas.” Plenty of Enlightenment nationalists did the same, as did the sharp-edged futurists to great infamy. But it would likewise be wrong not to mark the particular zeal with which many late Romantics barreled into oblivion, among them Rupert Brooke, Maurice Barrès, and Thomas Mann.
A reason to note the Romantics’ zeal for the war, vis-à-vis that of the Futurists, is that the Romantics are less likely suspects. The Futurists were not shy about their war fever. Their manifesto’s ninth point begins: “We will glorify war — the world’s only hygiene. . . .” That the Romantics, those champions of the enchanted and the organic and the individual, would gladly go in for what we now remember as a cynical and mechanical mass slaughter, should ring as a note of caution to anyone who hopes to find in romanticism a tonic for present troubles.
Even those Romantics less given to braying failed to meet the moment or else accommodated it. Consider the Georgian poets at the start of the war. Theirs was a pastoral world, one rendered in ennobling euphemism, with vestigial traces of Edwardian sporting spirit. British soldier-poets and their comrades took that world with them to war. Censored letters sustained it for the British public back home, carrying from the killing fields notes on cuckoos’ songs in France and talk of games well played. Much was made of football at the first Christmas’ truce.
When they went, the Georgians did not go reluctantly. They lent their pens to the cause. But little of their world survived. If there was a moment the old England’s sporting spirit died, it might’ve been when a British captain named W.P. Nevill took his men over the top at the Somme, signaling their advance by the kick of a football. The ball had barely landed when German guns killed Nevill. His men persevered, dribbling onwards for more than a mile into the trenches of the enemy. They performed well, but the damage was done, as we’ll see.
And just what sort of battle did Nevill’s kicked ball announce? One so brutal that its name remains a stand-in for automated slaughter, a rejoinder to the sporting spirit so complete that spirit never recovered. The canonical image we now carry with us of the war is that of the Somme: of men marching into scythe-like machine-gun fire. Eyewitnesses recall British troops going over the top in unhurried and handsome lines, centuries of tradition at their back, looking left and right “as if to correct their dressing on a parade ground,” only to immediately die. So awful was their fate that by 2 PM on the first day, the Germans were offering truces, out of pity.
What made the Somme’s blow to the past all the greater was the suffering of Lord Kitchener’s New Army. When early battles hobbled the pre-war British army, the war secretary Lord Kitchener had raised this replacement force of volunteers. To entice young men, Kitchener permitted them to form units of friends from their towns and villages, so that they might go to war alongside their friends. These formations became known as “pals battalions.” Thus when the battle destroyed a battalion, it destroyed the social lattice of an entire community. It was as if each were a neatly parceled and organic piece of the old world, fed to the grinder of the new.
The Somme’s destruction abides in our memories and shapes our imagination also because so many writers were on hand to witness the old world perish there. J.R.R. Tolkien, Adolf Hitler, Harold Macmillan, A.A. Milne, Otto Dix, Ernst Jünger, Ford Madox Ford, and Basil Liddell Hart are some. Paul Fussell, the great critic of Great War literature, credits Edmund Blunden with having done the most admirable job capturing it. But for our purposes it might be best to consider the passage through the Somme of two others: Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon.
The two met in late 1915. Graves had already fought at Loos (where he said his “emotion-recording apparatus” had broken) and Sassoon was green, but Sassoon was also older and richer and came from an Edwardian fever dream of greenswards and horses. The two of them swapped poems, found much to like in each other’s, but also had mutual criticisms they largely kept to themselves. Sassoon journaled that some of Graves’ verse was “repulsive” for its unflinching violence. Graves for his part grimaced at the innocent Sassoon’s maudlin images of glory, and subtly told Sassoon that “he would soon change his style.”
The troubled friendship that followed illustrates what survived through the Somme. They both saw action there. We know Graves was relatively steady until an exploding shell felled him. The shrapnel tore through his back, mauling him so badly that his command confirmed him dead and his death was falsely reported in the British papers. Sassoon by then had earned a nickname, “Mad Jack,” and played the romantic hero — clearing out a German trench on his own in Mametz Wood, only to sit in it alone, then give it up and walk back to British lines.
The Somme soured Sassoon’s poetry, but in other ways his romance limped on. In the summer of 1917 he released a pacifist declaration to the British press. The decision made it likely that Sassoon would appear before a court martial and face harsh punishment. The practical if not always even-tempered Graves, now recuperated, rescued Sassoon by convincing him to go before a medical board. The board diagnosed Sassoon with mental collapse and spared him disgrace. Sassoon enrolled at Craiglockhart War Hospital, a mental patient.
So Graves and Sassoon both survived the war, but Graves’ sanity barely did, and Sassoon’s romantic streak didn’t. The war humbled other neo-Romantics if it did not kill them. Some, like Rupert Brooke and Franz Marc and August Macke, died. Others, like the venomous wartime Thomas Mann, were made practically liberal, compelled into the sort of reflection that at its best yielded a Magic Mountain. Tolkien alone baffled many for having passed through the Somme, the deaths of his closest friends bookending the battle, only to produce a great work of myth.
The literary school that did emerge from the Somme, or at least the “dead spot” it left behind, is modernism. Though modernism traces roots back to the middle of the 19th century, the war seemed to serve as its worldwide debut. A shrewd German soldier named Ernst Jünger detected its arrival on the battlefield. The Somme was not merely a tactical engagement, it was a new “condition of things that dug itself in remorselessly.” Chivalry had bidden the world farewell at the Somme, and, Jünger wrote in the 1920s edition of Storm of Steel, “the Europe of to-day appeared here for the first time. . . .”
II.
Another sure way to survive the Somme is, if you’ve made it out, not to return. And in this sense, the modernists failed.
By August of 1916, a month or so after the battle began, an official but bloody war film called The Battle of the Somme relayed it to the British public in thousands of theaters. Despite its propagandistic purpose, the film unsettled audiences by the violence it conveyed and by the novelty of its medium. Still, some veterans found the film discordant with their own experience. The historian R.H. Tawney, who fought at the Somme, typified some veterans’ displeasure in an October essay, which took to task the public for its conception of the war:
“You have chosen to make for yourselves an image of the war. . . . [Y]ou are afraid of what may happen to your souls if you expose them to the inconsistencies and contradictions, the doubts and bewilderment, which lie beneath the surface of things.”
Though the movement is famously ill-defined, Tawney here gives us a working definition. To bare to the world the “doubts and bewilderment which lie beneath the surface of things” was much of the modernist project, and other articulate veterans echoed Tawney’s bewilderment. One specifies articulate because, as Paul Fussell has shown, the war’s strange violence surpassed many veterans’ capacity for expression. Edmund Blunden would write of the Somme that “disjointedness now dominates the picture.” In his trilogy Parade’s End, the Somme veteran Ford Madox Ford would suggest the impossibility of a coherent view:
“Imagine standing up on a hill! It was the unthinkable thing there!”
If the war eluded description, it was because at a quite literal level, old familiar forms had been replaced by modern abstracted ones. Jünger wrote from the German side of the Somme: “The village of Guillemont seemed to have disappeared without trace; just a whitish stain on the cratered field indicated where one of the limestone houses had been pulverized.” He was speaking of the sights he saw as he marched on the periphery of the war, but he might’ve been describing the collapse of realist oil paintings by their modernist successors.
The inability to cohere the world, let alone to express it, so great was the nature of the change, drew remarks from many corners. After the war, Paul Valéry would express the same in his letters. Describing the post-war moment, he wrote:
An extraordinary shudder ran through the marrow of Europe. She felt in every nucleus of her mind that she was no longer the same, that she was no longer herself, that she was about to lose consciousness, a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable calamities, by thousands of men of the first rank, from innumerable geographical, ethnic, and historical coincidences. . . .
When Europe did regain consciousness, it awoke modernist. Or at least its high art did. The names Ezra Pound and Virginia Woolf and James Joyce and T. S. Eliot, alongside many others, are canonical to us now. But in 1919 they were an elite and talented and loosely held clique offering an aesthetic mode to fill the void the Somme and its attendant infernos left behind. One need not here expound on the works of disjointedness and bewilderment they produced, be it The Waste Land or Mrs. Dalloway or Ulysses.
Crucially, the modernists were not present at the Somme, and for the most part did not fight in the war, which is of course part of the reason why they were around after to define what followed. Joyce waited out the war in Zurich. Pound reaped the benefits of his expatriate status. Yeats was already old. Woolf, a civilian. An important exception might be Wyndham Lewis, who did fight. One can allow for the fact that civilians also experienced the hardships and cultural shock of the war, and still mark this conspicuous divide.
The division between the modernists who did not fight and the other writers who did is easy to mark also because the modernists marked it themselves. This is typified not only by Lytton Strachey’s possibly apocryphal rejoinder to those who reproached him for his disinclination to service (“I am the civilization they are trying to defend,”) but also by Pound’s own response to Eliot’s late interest in enlisting. Eliot’s biographer relates Pound went to the Embassy “to point out that if this were a war for civilization, it was folly to shoot one of six or seven Americans capable of understanding the word.”
That’s not to say that the modernists weren’t capable of remarkable works about the war, but they did not comment on it directly. It’s been observed that W. B. Yeats made no mention of the Somme, despite the massive losses to Irish regiments there, choosing instead to focus on the Easter Uprising or else expressing his detachment via an imagined Irish pilot. Pound seems incurious about the whole thing. And though T.S. Eliot captured the post-war malaise in The Waste Land in ways that still command our attention a century on, he rarely made a direct approach to the events of the war itself.
The most important exception to the modernists’ indirect handling of the war is Virginia Woolf. Much is rightly made of the remarkable interlude in To the Lighthouse, during which the war blows through the empty summer home of a well-to-do English family as a wind. But Woolf’s most substantive comment on the Somme comes via a little-cited piece of correspondence for The Times called “Heard on the Downs.” Woolf reported from the chalk hills of the South Downs, where the booming guns from the Somme could be heard. Some romanticize the sound, but not the local women:
More prosaically, it sounds like the beating of gigantic carpets by gigantic women, at a distance. . . . [W]hen [a farmer’s daughter] came to hatch out her eggs, she will tell you, only five of the dozen had live chicks in them, and the rest were addled. This she attributes unhesitatingly to vibrations in the earth caused by the shock of the great guns in Flanders. If you express doubt she will overwhelm you with evidence from all the country round. But no one here limits the action of the guns to the addling of a few hen’s eggs; the very sun in the sky, they assert, has been somehow deranged in his mechanism by our thunder on earth.
The resultant works of the modernists deal in symbols, clipped scenes, interior monologues, scattered media, all intended to convey the inner realities which “lie below the surface of things,” in the words of R.H. Tawney. Edmund Wilson would write that the war left the world “peculiarly hospitable to a literature indifferent to action and unconcerned with the group.” And at their best they are brilliant. By 1931 the modernists had taken their mode to its limit: “the world of the private imagination in isolation from the life of society” could be explored little further, Wilson found.
The trouble was that the modernists did push their mode further, past what Edmund Wilson judged its reasonable limit. The result was that their preoccupation with symbol, as Frank Kermode argued in The Sense of an Ending, transformed fiction into myth, at which point modernists began to live “by that which was designed only to know by.” Robert Graves himself, alongside Laura Riding, derided the modernists (a term some think Graves introduced in print) for having, “in an effort to overcome the distinction between subject-matter and form,” left the reader without any recognizable landmarks by which to navigate their real world.
But it was Yeats, one of the great modernist poets, who perhaps put most eloquently the error that he had made. He did so at the end of his life in “The Circus Animals’ Desertion”:
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder’s gone
I must lie down where all the ladders start
In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart.
It wasn’t just Yeats. Many of the modernists had forgotten the “rag and bone shop of the heart.” And as a result, for allowing fiction to become myth, the modernists’ literature failed them politically. It was a poor guide for the “low dishonest decade,” as Auden called the ‘30s. This much was evidenced by the strange turns of many, be they Eliot or Wyndham Lewis, and, at the most extreme, Ezra Pound. Far from escaping the destruction of the Somme, the modernists found themselves confronted with another such Armageddon, one by some measures more ghastly still.
If we grant that there is any analogue between the epistemic collapse brought about by the Somme and our present moment, the next question to ask is: what came after modernism? Edmund Wilson foretold in Axel’s Castle that modernism’s failure would be followed by an oscillation back to objectivity from subjectivity. A return to the rag and bone shop, as it were. The trick is that, in the case of 2026, our view of objective reality is obstructed in ways that even Edmund Wilson might have failed to imagine.
III.
We’ve not lived through a material Somme, and for that we ought be grateful. The suffering wrought by artificial intelligence does not begin to compare to those who lived through the battle. But just as the mass destruction of the Somme fatally undermined the structures of authority and organization that made the battle possible, inherited structures of knowledge now quake. One need not judge the final consequence of artificial intelligence in markets or world affairs to know as much. Today we must question the authenticity of media that only several years ago we readily granted were authentic. To do so is unsettling because much of our lives is now mediated.
The writer’s task in this new and counterfeit world is to offer the reader a genuine literature. That literature might transcend genre and form, but it will be alike for deriving that scarce genuine quality from two things: experience and responsibility. In the Somme’s wake, both offered something like salvation, and here I’ll try to set them apart from the qualities of the romantics and the modernists. My aim is to begin to sketch an alternative expansive enough to permit imagination and firm enough to withstand examination.
We might start with the need. The power of artificial intelligence has made new fiction suspect by default. The institutions and honors meant to embody literary discernment have been duped or else found unequal to the moment. George Steiner augured the death of the novel back in 1996. The form may yet survive but artificial intelligence, a maturation of the “virtual reality” with which Steiner contended, has brought many, however belatedly, to Steiner’s side. Writers unpublished and much-feted alike can now be heard saying that artificial intelligence is the end of them.
The hopelessness alone calls to mind the Somme. One detects in the way people speak of artificial intelligence’s inexorable advance echoes of those who observed the destruction of an old world: So Edmund Blunden read in “a sad scrawl of broken earth and murdered men” looping through the Somme that “neither race had won, nor could win, the War. The War had won, and would go on winning” Even the more thoughtful artificial intelligence pioneers, like Demis Hassabis, strike a similarly fatalistic chord.
If we grant the analogue to the Somme, what might it teach us about the future of literature? First, it suggests that romanticism and re-enchantment deliver less than they promise. The neo-Romantics baying for war in 1914 remind us that spiritualism can lead to dehumanization as surely as any other dogma. There were of course Romantics who stood up to the war, and the tradition has gifted us great literature, but the record of its inheritors during the Great War suggests mere enchantment is a sorry guide when worlds come apart.
Likewise the study of interiority, of the world as perceived by or within the human subject, will not suffice. The modernists adopted the individual perspective, retreated from the hilltop view that Ford’s soldiers found impossible, declared a disinterest in action, and still ended up without the necessary intellectual equipment to meet the challenges of their age. However brilliant their great works were, in the end they lost themselves, for having, in the words of Graves and Riding, removed the landmarks that make for the paths by which they might find their way.
Then what is the way? A third one might be suggested by a recent paper on the limits of artificial intelligence. It comes from two great authorities in their field, Richard Sutton and David Silver. They are teacher and student. The former did much to invent reinforcement learning. The latter applied reinforcement learning to develop AlphaGo, a computer program which announced for many the arrival of advanced artificial intelligence back in 2016. Silver then built AlphaZero, an even better player, on no human data at all. Last year they published together a paper called “Welcome to the Era of Experience.”
The argument Sutton and Silver make is this: artificial intelligence has largely exhausted existing corpora of human-generated data. The exhaustion of this data source limits the progress of artificial intelligence. Soon, however, agents in synthetic environments or else equipped with sensors and robotic arms will begin experiencing the world in embodied form and so generate data about the world for themselves, on which they can then train. This moment will launch the “Era of Experience” — referring, perhaps bleakly, to robot rather than human experience.
But there is another way of reading the Sutton and Silver paper: that until artificial intelligence is embodied, its progress is limited, and for the time being, experience remains the human domain. Sutton and Silver suspect this window is closing, but we need not be so sure, and even if embodied agents are arriving shortly, their capacity to experience remains limited. The sort of knowledge spun off from experience, “tacit knowledge” in the words of Michael Polanyi, “embodied knowledge” in the words of Aled Maclean-Jones for this very Review, thus remains a scarce and human domain.
This premium on experience suggests a way forward. That way is what I’ve called a genuine literature. It would require that writers find for themselves and for their readers the sort of knowledge that emergent technology can’t yet find: tacit knowledge. To do so, writers must experience the embodied world, so as to come into contact with transient and local truths, particular ones that dispel hallucination or give rise to awfully specific ones of our own make and use, the sort of truths Woolf found among farmers on the South Downs who felt the guns from Flanders, the sort of truths Graves knew would move Sassoon to “change his style.”
The idea that experience gives rise to writing worth reading is not entirely new. In “The Art of Fiction,” Henry James, whose mind Eliot admiringly wrote was “so fine that no idea could violate it,” counseled the novice to write from experience, but with an important qualification: that experience was not merely what one saw, it was what one could glean from what one saw in a “particular corner”:
The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life, in general, so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it.
In doing so one begins to arrive at a “common sense” of the world, precisely the sort of sense that Graves and Riding felt was absent in the work of the more excessive modernist poets, precisely the sort of sense that seems to evade the hysterics of Mann at the height of the war but returns in some elusive way to Hans Castorp in the 1920s. Hemingway, a more grounded modernist, would later write of the difference between a fact “observed badly” and one well observed. Either way, that capacity to observe comes “out of experience” alone.
As frontier labs scale up compute and data and their models grow so good at writing that all their tells vanish, a writer’s particular experience will thus become the coin of the writing realm. The uneven texture of the world, the sort of illegible or analog data that evades digital sensors, will be the thing for which people turn to a human voice. This rare stuff will not come to the writer. The writer will have to go to it. Once gained, it will make a writer credible, sadly all the more so as readers themselves forfeit experience to mediated or modeled reality.
What about irony amidst all this earnestness? After all, did not Fussell say that the Somme brought about the ironic mode characteristic of the modern mind? In short, experience is the path to a better irony than the one we have on hand. Many people live out their lives in almost entirely mediated fashion, and indulge irony nonetheless, mistaking its bitter twist for some insight into the working of the world. But what use is the irony expressed by someone who has experienced nothing?
There is some good news: this prospect can liberate the writer who worries about how to make a living as a writer. It may soon be that the only way to be a writer is to have a day job — not because writing won’t pay, though it might not, but because work is what gives you something scarce to say. This is not an innovation — others have documented well how many of the writers whom we admire held down jobs of their own. We’ve just reached the tail end of a particularly discursive century. It may soon look strange, in the rearview mirror, that people ever expected to feed themselves on words alone.
This thought brings us to the second and final quality of a genuine literature, the other quality besides experience. It’s been observed that experience alone is insufficient. To be a passive vessel through which experience passes neither ennobles us nor makes us wiser. Certainly, if Sutton and Silver are to be believed, robots will be able to do the same shortly. So writers cannot settle for hoovering up experience, as if their writing careers were one great gap year. Such writers, writers that serve as a wry camera lens, will be made redundant by artificial intelligence.
What then delivers the sort of meaning still salient in the age of artificial intelligence? The answer is responsibility. It is an unattractive prospect for many writers — a certain degree of detachment is thought necessary to observe the world well. But detachment in the age of artificial intelligence is no longer scarce. What are the models now trained at frontier labs if not admirably detached? And as more labor is automated, what will that leave the public if not detached?
The rare thing will be an earned partiality, a responsibility. Such responsibility will make writers judges — not in the sense that an aesthete is a judge — but judges in a smaller and more human sense. And artificial intelligence cannot be made a judge. Not legally, and more importantly, not ethically. So argued the late Brian Cantwell Smith. Artificial intelligence can reckon, he theorized back in 2019, and we know now it will soon exceed any human capacity to reckon. But for its inability to make commitments, it cannot judge.
What good does responsibility do for literature, besides setting it apart from artificial intelligence? For one, it denies the writer an exit from meaning. Responsibility — be it to a family, or to a student, or to a patient, or to a customer, or to a colleague, or to a congregation, or to a teammate, or to a friend — has the effect of weighing us down to the world with which experience brings us in contact. If we are responsible, we are no longer passive. We are no longer, in the words of Edmund Wilson, “indifferent to action and unconcerned with the group.” The valuation such action requires invests our experience with meaning.
Responsibility also grants us access to the interior self which modernists at their best revealed — to the bewilderment and doubts which Tawney found at the Somme but not in the imagination of the public back home. It does so by forcing us not only to see things but to make decisions about others. In making those decisions, we must weigh values and then commit to our weights. So we learn the content of our souls. So we can begin to imagine the contents of the souls of others.
That is why the pragmatists, the same ones whose influences touched T.S. Eliot at Harvard, thought that belief was best defined not as that thing which one will write about, but that thing which one acts upon. Eliot’s dissertation argued that practical interests when acted upon over a series of experiences give rise to one’s sense of self. He forewent that defense to pursue literature. But his observations were borne out by the writers of the Somme whom he did not join.
And that brings us back to the Somme. For what, if not responsibility to one’s fellow man, do we read in the most moving testimonies of its writers? Owen might’ve defined this genuine literature when he wrote to his mother in 1918 that “I came out in order to help these boys — directly by leading them as well as an officer can; indirectly by watching their sufferings that I may speak of them as well as a pleader can.” So too might a guilt-wracked and protesting Sassoon have meant it, when he wrote from his Craiglockhart room this prayer for the men he left behind:
The darkness tells how vainly I have striven
To free them from the pit where they must dwell
In outcast gloom convulsed and jagged and riven
By grappling guns. Love drove me to rebel.
Love drives me back to grope with them through hell;
And in their tortured eyes I stand forgiven.
It is the expression of the love among soldiers who, saturated with experience, felt responsible to each other. That same makes Tolkien’s world, haunted by the ghosts of the friends he lost at the Somme, so deeply familiar despite its fantasy. It’s the sort of love one critic saw in Parade’s End, the masterwork of the Somme veteran Ford Madox Ford. For despite Ford’s wartime suffering, despite charred lungs and pain and fever and neuritis, what impresses us is that Ford remained “able to produce a work so generous, humane, and sane.” That such fellow feeling could survive the Somme is not only a miracle to be marked on this anniversary, it is also a lesson.